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When some sixty years ago, in the middle of the Second World War, Paul 
Oskar Kristeller began his great project of reinterpreting Renaissance 
humanism, he could not possibly have imagined just how fruitful his 
hypothesis would prove to be in the decades to follow. As is well known, 
Kristeller rejected the historiographical tradition descending from Francesco 
Fiorentino, Bertrando Spaventa, Giovanni Gentile and Ernst Cassirer that 
tended to assimilate Renaissance humanism to modern philosophical hu-
manisms—humanism as a philosophy of man—and insisted on historicizing 
the phenomenon. His goal was to make a clean distinction between con-
temporary humanism and the studia humanitatis of the Renaissance.1 For 
Kristeller humanism was a literary movement inspired by the antique but 
with its roots in the Middle Ages; in one famous formulation, he described 
the movement as a particular stage in the history of rhetoric; in another, 
as a cycle of disciplines embracing grammar, rhetoric, history, poetry and 
moral philosophy.2 Kristeller’s interpretation of humanism, widely accepted 
in the Anglo-Saxon world, gave rise in its turn to a major historiographical 
tradition, and one which is still lively and creative, to judge from two recent 
books, Ronald Witt’s ‘In the Footsteps of the Ancients’ and Robert Black’s 
Humanism and Education in Medieval and Renaissance Italy.3
1  See James Hankins, “Renaissance Humanism and Historiography Today,” in Palgrave 
Advances in Renaissance Historiography, ed. Jonathan Woolfson (New York, 2005), pp. 73–96; 
also the article of Robert Black, “The Renaissance and Humanism: Deﬁnitions and Origins,” 
in the same volume, pp. 97–117. See also my essays, “Two Twentieth-Century Interpreters of 
Renaisssance Humanism,” and “Renaissance Philosophy between God and the Devil,” both 
in Humanism and Platonism in the Italian Renaissance, 2 vols. (Rome, 2003–04), 1: 573–590 
and 1: 591–615, respectively.
2  Kristeller stated his views on Renaissance humanism in many places, but they are 
conveniently summarized in Paul Oskar Kristeller, “The Humanist Movement,” in idem, 
Renaissance Thought and Its Sources, ed. Michael Mooney (New York, 1979), pp. 21–32.
3  Ronald G. Witt, ‘In the Footsteps of the Ancients’: The Origins of Humanism from Lovato 
to Bruni (Leiden, 2000); Robert Black, Humanism and Education in Medieval and Renaissance 
Italy: Tradition and Innovation in Latin Schools from the Twelfth to the Fifteenth Century 
(Cambridge, Eng., 2001). For a recent Italian dissent from Kristeller’s interpretation, see 
Riccardo Fubini, “Renaissance Humanism and its Development in Florentine Civic Culture,” 
in Palgrave Advances, pp. 118–38.
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Witt and Black are hardly in accord on every issue, but it is worth point-
ing out that they are very much in agreement about one key element of 
Kristeller’s view of humanism, namely, the continuity between medieval 
literary culture and Renaissance humanism. Both books, indeed, could 
almost be regarded as radicalizations or extreme forms of the Kristeller 
thesis. Witt’s book makes the argument for continuity in far stronger terms 
than Kristeller ever did; for him, the origins of Italian humanism are to be 
found in the later thirteenth century, when certain ﬁgures in Tuscany and 
northeastern Italy took over the literary heritage of high medieval France, 
gradually extending and transforming it through various literary genres. 
Black’s book insists on the continuity of grammatical instruction from 
the early thirteenth century through the end of the ﬁfteenth, and argues 
that the real educational innovators in the Western humanist tradition are 
to be found, not in the early ﬁfteenth, but in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries.
Belief in a fundamental continuity between medieval and Renaissance 
culture is undoubtedly now dominant through most of the Anglo-Saxon 
academic universe, and has had the predictable result of (further) undermin-
ing the period concept of the Renaissance.4 Even a scholar such as Quentin 
Skinner, who has recently reasserted the distinctiveness of Renaissance 
republicanism, has nevertheless himself done much to undercut that dis-
tinctiveness by his researches into medieval republican thought.5 The present 
writer has no wish to call the continuity thesis into question, and Kristeller, 
Witt and Black are doubtless correct in ﬁnding the roots of humanism as 
a stylistic ideal in the High Middle Ages (though one can also agree with 
Riccardo Fubini that the full ideological consciousness of the movement 
emerges only with Petrarch).6 Yet there is no contradiction in also examining 
the literary products of the humanists for the marks of modernity. Even if 
the posture of a man with one foot in the Middle Ages, saluting with the 
other the rising dawn of the Renaissance—to quote Charles Homer Haskins’ 
famous dictum—is an awkward one, it is by no means an illogical one. 
Unless we believe, against all the evidence, that origins are destiny, or that 
the medieval and the modern are mutually exclusive categories, it seems 
4  See Fubini’s acute remark in the article cited in the previous note (p. 123) that “It is 
evident that an historiography that approaches such an imposing break with tradition in a 
traditional spirit cannot but confound its own raison d’être.”
5  Quentin Skinner, “Introduction: The Reality of the Renaissance,” in Visions of Politics, 
2 (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 1–9, but see chapters 2–4 in the same volume.
6  Fubini, “Renaissance Humanism,” pp. 123–24.
MAZZOCCO_f9_137-153   138 3/10/06   18:02:26  religion and the modernity of renaissance humanism  139
perfectly possible a priori that at some point in its development, in some 
branches of its activity, the humanist movement developed ideas, methods 
and intellectual routines that are recognizably modern. It is even, dare one 
say it, perfectly possible that important aspects of modernity had their roots 
in the thought of the Italian humanists, even if the latter were primarily 
literary men and did not constitute a philosophical school.
One problem with hunting for the roots of modernity, of course, is 
that the idea of modernity is polysemous—its deﬁnition varies depending 
on whether one is an economic historian, an historian of the arts or of 
science, a social historian or an historian of politics and political theory. 
Modernity is also a moving target. What was modern for Burckhardt in 
the nineteenth century is no longer modern for us. For Burckhardt, what 
stood out as modern was the dominance of the nation state, liberal indi-
vidualism, secularism and the decline of religious belief. None of these 
“modern” phenomena would necessarily be considered modern today. For 
example, many, especially in Europe, believe the nation state belongs in 
the dustbin of history and is destined to be replaced by supranational or 
international orders. While liberal individualism has enjoyed great success 
in the social sphere, morphing, since the 1960s especially, into the more 
radical and demotic forms of expressive individualism and the culture of 
authenticity, it has not been popular among political theorists for at least a 
generation, and its behaviors are more and more divorced from the politi-
cal realm. Libertarians are just about the only theorists who still want to 
erect individualism into a political theory, and they are a tiny minority in 
the academy and the political sphere in general. And while institutional 
religion has continued to be moribund in Europe, the same is not true 
of the rest of the world. Christianity and Islam are the fastest-growing 
religions in the world, far outpacing the spread of secular philosophies, 
and it is the conservative, dogmatic forms of these religions which have 
proved the most successful, not their more liberal or “modern” variants. 
There may be a Unitarian or two in China, for all we know, but there are 
not many. Comte’s positivist prophecy of a scientiﬁc and secular future 
has failed to materialize outside Western Europe, and even there is under 
threat from the spread of Islam. Hostility to dogmatism has a tendency to 
slide into lack of conviction, it seems, which is a poor defense against the 
passionate intensity of true believers. Even the Enlightenment hope for 
progress towards religious universalism, towards ﬁnding some “essence 
of religion” on which all religions could agree, thus bringing an end to 
religious war, has been fatally undermined. Modern anthropological and 
sociological understandings of religion as a family-resemblance concept 
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makes it increasingly implausible that any reductionist approach to dogma 
will yield something like religious unity.7
It is religion that I wish to discuss here, and more particularly, the 
modernity of a certain strain of Renaissance humanism with respect to its 
understanding of religion. It can be argued, it seems to me, that philoso-
phers like Nicolaus Cusanus, Marsilio Ficino, Pico della Mirandola, and 
Francesco Patrizi of Cherso explored a new way of thinking about religion 
that has numerous analogies with the way religion is understood in the 
contemporary world. It might be objected that, by Kristeller’s deﬁnition of 
humanism, Cusanus, Ficino, Pico and Patrizi are philosophers, not human-
ists. But even if we embrace Kristeller’s strict separation between human-
ists and philosophers, a conceptual operation not always easy to perform, 
it cannot be denied that these thinkers were deeply marked by humanist 
study of antiquity. The matter could be put even more strongly, for it is 
surely true that the humanist element in their thought that is primarily 
responsible for their attitude is religion. It was the eﬀort to comprehend 
and incorporate ancient religious wisdom into Christianity that sparked 
Renaissance philosophy’s most profound meditations on the nature of 
religion itself.
The understanding of religion I am referring to is found in texts such 
as Bessarion’s Oratio dogmatica de Unione (1439), Cusanus’ De pace ﬁdei 
(1453), Ficino’s De christiana religione (1474) and Theologia platonica de 
immortalitate (1482), Patrizi’s Nova de universis philosophia (1593) and more 
implicitly in Pico’s Oration and Nine Hundred Theses (1486). In these writ-
ings, Renaissance thinkers move beyond the antagonistic categories used 
to typologize religions that are found in ancient and medieval Christian 
writers: the categories of obsolescence and heresy. In these conceptions, as 
described by R.W. Southern and other scholars, Judaism and paganism are 
ordinarily relegated to the category of obsolescence. Though the Jews were 
vouchsafed a shadowy religious truth through the law and the prophets, 
that wisdom was now fulﬁlled and superseded by Christian revelation, 
and Jews who persisted in the old law were typically seen by Christians as 
“stubborn” or “stiﬀ-necked” for their refusal to accept the new dispensa-
tion. The pagans had had their wise men, some of whom had intimations 
of Christian truth, but their religion was corrupt and pernicious, and 
their gods were demons bent on destroying true religion. Greek Orthodox 
Christians were heretics and schismatics, their deﬁance of Rome’s authority 
7  Anthony Giddens, Sociology (Oxford, 1989), p. 452; John Hick, The Interpretation of 
Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT, 2004), pp. 3–5.
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leading them to embrace Trinitarian heresy about the procession of the Holy 
Spirit. Islam was the worst of all. Mohammed was a false prophet possessed 
by a demon, and the Koran was dictated by demons. The admixture of 
praiseworthy elements in it was merely a demonic ploy to delude the wise 
and good. Islam in general was an evil heresy, a scourge sent by God to 
punish faithless Christians.8
When the humanist movement began to gain ground in Italy in the later 
fourteenth century, these traditional, clerical attitudes and beliefs began to 
come under pressure. The popularity of the philosophical works of Cicero, 
with their urbane assumption that the theological beliefs of educated people 
had little or nothing in common with popular religion, surely had a wide 
impact. The De natura deorum in particular presented the innumerable 
humanist admirers of Cicero with an understanding of religion inimical 
to clerical dogmatism. Cicero goes so far as to claim (1.10) that dogmatic 
statements by authoritative teachers are a positive hindrance to honest in-
quiry. Cicero’s own inclination to the reductive universalism of the Stoics 
(3.95), which amounts to a belief in God, Providence, the divine perfection 
of the world and human participation in divine reason, is combined with a 
prudential commitment to preserving traditional rites and ceremonies; he 
manages to convey the strong suggestion that in the expression of religious 
beliefs private convictions need to be subordinated to the public needs of 
the state (2.168, 3.5). The latter position is one echoed by Poggio in the 
Historia tripartita, Thomas More in his Utopia, as well as by Machiavelli 
and Montaigne, among others.
The humanist project in general, of course, entailed a more deferential 
attitude to pagan antiquity—indeed in some cases a positive adoration of 
the classical world—and this relative openness to pagan culture seems to 
have led to a kind of cognitive dissonance. Something had to be done to 
rescue pagan wisdom and distinguish it from the crude pagan superstitions 
excoriated by the Church Fathers. Thus Boccaccio and Salutati rediscovered 
the late third- and early fourth-century strand of Christian apologetics 
typiﬁed by Lactantius and Eusebius that found a close kinship between 
the theologies of the pagan philosophers and more sophisticated styles of 
Christian theology. This high paganism was ultimately, by Ficino and others, 
identiﬁed with Platonism and its forerunners, Hermetism, Orphism, and 
8  Norman Daniel, Islam and the West: The Making of an Image (Edinburgh, 1958); Richard 
W. Southern, Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, MA, 1962); Franco 
Cardini, Europe and Islam, trans. Caroline Beamish (Oxford, 1999); Nancy Bisaha, Creating 
East and West: Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks (Philadelphia, 2004).
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Zoroastrianism. To be sure, the more circumspect—and more authorita-
tive—theologies of Jerome, Ambrose and Augustine a century later aimed to 
make clearer distinctions between what was pagan and what was Christian, 
even while exploiting the conceptual apparatus and authority of the pagan 
philosophers for apologetic ends. But Augustine, Ambrose and even Jerome 
could be read—and were read—selectively, as simple endorsements of the 
value of pagan philosophy to Christians.
My impression is that the eﬀort to recover and incorporate this alien 
religious wisdom—the product of a separate revelation rather than mere 
natural reason—ultimately underlay the new attitude to religious diversity 
one ﬁnds in the ﬁfteenth century, as well as the strikingly ecumenical at-
titudes of humanists at the Council of Florence.9 If the fourth-century Latin 
Church Fathers had been line-drawers, Quattrocento humanists were line-
blurrers. They were eager to show the common ground between Christians 
and virtuous pagans—unlike Augustine or Jerome, who were concerned 
to make paganism less glamorous to Christians and potential converts.10 
But the same receptive attitude could carry over to other religions, even 
contemporary religions. Thus Cusanus in the vision-dialogue De pace ﬁdei 
(1453) employs a kind of metaphysical reductionism to translate Christian 
conceptions such as the Trinity, the Incarnation and the Redemption into 
terms acceptable to Muslims, Jews and Hindus. The Trinity, for example, 
is an expression of the inherent metaphysical interrelationship of unitas, 
aequalitas, and connexio.11 Cusanus hopes that his version of Neoplatonic 
metaphysics, particularly his Proclan principle of the coincidentia opposito-
rum, will provide a basis for inter-religious dialogue and religious peace.12 
This is quite diﬀerent from Thomas Aquinas’ approach in the Summa 
contra Gentiles where certain general theological truths, “preambles of 
the faith,” are established by natural reason as a preliminary to convert-
ing non-Christians to speciﬁcally Christian beliefs. Cusanus’ position is 
  9  On this see my Plato in the Italian Renaissance, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1990), 1: 221–225.
10  See for example Augustine’s remarkable De vera religione, where he tries to convince 
philosophical pagans that the spread of Christianity was the fulﬁllment of the wildest dreams 
of the philosophers for the spread of virtue and spiritual enlightenment.
11  De pace ﬁdei 6.17, in Nicolaus Cusanus, Opera omnia iussu et auctoritate Academiae 
Litterarum Heidelbergensis, 7.1–2: De pace ﬁdei, cum epistula ad Ioannem de Segobia, ed. 
Raymond Klibansky and Hildebrand Bascour (Hamburg, 1959–70), p. 16. See Rudolf Haubst, 
Das Bild des einen und dreieinen Gottes in der Welt nach Nikolaus von Kues (Trier, 1952) for 
Cusanus’ sources, particularly Augustine’s De trinitate.
12  See James E. Biechler, “Interreligious Dialogue,” in Introducing Nicholas of Cusa. A 
Guide to a Renaissance Man, eds. Christopher M. Bellitto, Thomas M. Izbicki and Gerald 
Christianson (New York, 2004), pp. 270–296.
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that Muslims already believe distinctive Christian doctrines implicitly. 
In his later Cribatio Alkorani (1461) he tries to show that the teaching of 
Muhammed in the Koran is “implicitly trinitarian and christological,”13 and 
that a person “of vigorous intellect” who read the Koran piously would be 
led from the letter of the text and the sensible world to a knowledge of 
the divine.14 Here Cusanus’ Neoplatonism appears to be the forerunner of 
Enlightenment universalism, anticipating the religious ideas of ﬁgures such 
as Ralph Cudworth and Matthew Tindal. Given this lineage it is perhaps 
no surprise that Cusanus’ conception in the De pace ﬁdei of “una religio in 
varietate rituum” bears a remarkable resemblance to the Oxford indologist 
F. Max Mueller’s deﬁnition of religion as “a disposition which enables men 
to apprehend the inﬁnite under diﬀerent names and disguises.”15
The same receptive attitude to non-Christian religious truths is found 
in Pico’s Oration and Nine Hundred Theses. There, if my understanding of 
these texts is correct, pagan, Jewish, Islamic, Hindu and other theologies are 
mined with a view to enabling a higher synthesis, a synthesis still recogniz-
ably Christian, but immeasurably deepened, enriched, and strengthened 
by the treasuries of religious wisdom found in other traditions, including 
ancient theologies such as Platonism, Hermetism, Zoroastrianism, Orphism, 
medieval Arabic theology and Jewish Kabbalism.16 Pico’s aim, to be sure, 
is not to show that all theologies agreed in all respects. He was not an 
eclectic of the ancient type who believed that all philosophers agreed in 
substance, disagreeing only about words. He held that every major theo-
logical tradition contained elements of truth and that these elements could 
be combined into a grand synthesis that was at the same time compatible 
with orthodox Christianity. Like Nicholas of Cusa in the Cribatio Alkorani, 
he believed that the understanding previous theologians had of the sources 
of their own theological traditions was not necessarily correct. In fact his 
aim was to construct a new theology using material from existing historical 
theologies as building blocks. His new theology would be superior to exist-
ing theologies because it would give a richer understanding of Christian 
13  Biechler, “Interreligious Dialogue,” p. 285.
14  See especially the Cribatio Alkorani, 1.20, “Digressio ad manuductionem divinorum,” 
in Cusanus, Opera Omnia, vol. 8: Cribatio Alkorani, ed. Ludwig Hagemann (Hamburg, 
1986), pp. 94–100. 
15  Cited by Alistair E. McGrath, Christian Theology: An Introduction, 3rd ed. (Oxford, 
2001), p. 536.
16  Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Oration and Nine Hundred Theses, ed. Brian P. 
Copenhaver, forthcoming in the I Tatti Renaissance Library (Cambridge, MA, 2006). On Pico’s 
concordism in general see Fernand Roulier, Jean Pic de Mirandole (1463–1494), humaniste, 
philosophe et théologien (Geneva, 1989).
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truths. This is not to imply that Pico was interested in directly challenging 
Christian dogmas. But he did wish (like many humanists) to move Christian 
theological speculation beyond the narrow circle of traditional authorities 
represented by Aristotle, the Bible and the Sentences of Peter Lombard. 
Situating Christian theology in the spectrum of world theologies would 
show both the superiority of Christian truth and the presence of Christian 
truths in all religions. Pico’s ecumenism is therefore a militant ecumen-
ism. In this respect, he reminds one of modern theologians like the Jesuit 
Karl Rahner.17 But it could be argued that Pico is even more open to non-
Christian religious traditions than Rahner, given his hope that recovering 
the esoteric truths of other religious traditions would make the mysteries 
of Christianity more intelligible.
The ﬁrst half of the sixteenth century was obviously not a period when 
ecumenical gestures towards non-Christian religions would ﬁnd ready wel-
come, but before the passions of the Reformation took hold in the 1520s, it 
did produce one famous and inﬂuential text which mirrored the religious 
ideas of the Renaissance Neoplatonists, namely Thomas More’s Utopia 
(1516). The relationship of this text to ﬁfteenth-century Italian Platonism 
has not, I think, been fully appreciated. In the section of Utopia “On the 
Religions of the Utopians,” More acknowledges that his Utopians have a 
number of religions, but the “vast majority, and those by far the wiser ones” 
hold to a philosophical conception of the divinity:
a single divinity, unknown, eternal, immeasurable, inexplicable, beyond the 
grasp of the human mind, and diﬀused throughout the universe, not by his 
mass, but by his power. Him they call their parent, and to him alone they 
attribute the origin, increase, progress, changes and ends of all things.18
Here More excludes a materialistic conception of the divinity, typical of 
ancient Stoicism, and like Plotinus, Proclus and Nicolaus Cusanus (but 
unlike Thomas Aquinas) sees God or the One as radically unknowable. As 
in ancient and Renaissance Platonic theology he is related to creation by 
his power (virtus), and is the source, pattern and goal of all created real-
ity. More goes on to say that the Utopians call their god Mythra, who is 
17  Karl Rahner, S.J., “Christianity and the Non-Christian Religions,” in Theological 
Investigations, 5 (London, 1966), pp. 115–34.
18  Thomas More, Utopia. Latin Text and English Translation, eds. George M. Logan, 
Robert M. Adams and Clarence H. Miller (Cambridge, Eng., 1995), p. 219 (the translation 
has been slightly adjusted). The Latin is: “unum quoddam numen putant, incognitum, aeter-
num, immensum, inexplicabile, quod supra mentis humanae captum sit, per mundum hunc 
universum virtute, non mole diﬀusum; hunc parentem vocant. Origines, auctus, progressus, 
vices, ﬁnesque rerum omnium huic acceptos uni referunt.”
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generally identiﬁed by commentators with the Persian god Mithras. This 
suggests that More was thinking in terms of an ancient theology derived 
from Zoroastrianism, Mithras being often invoked in the Orphic Hymns 
which Ficino, following Pletho, attributed to Zoroaster. As Zoroastrianism 
was the form of religious wisdom speciﬁc to Asia in Ficino’s conception, it 
was the most appropriate one for Utopia. The Utopians, More says, believe 
monotheism was established by the consensus of all nations (omnium 
consensu gentium) and states that Utopian society was moving away from 
a variety of superstitions in the direction of a single philosophical religion 
“more reasonable than any of the others” (quae reliquas ratione videtur 
antecellere). The fact the Utopians easily convert to Christianity, “either 
through the secret inspiration or because Christianity seemed very like 
the sect that most prevails among them,” is meant to show, I think, that 
Utopia is simply at an earlier stage of historical development vis á vis reli-
gion, and that their ancient philosophical religion has well prepared them 
to receive the truths of the Gospel—so long as these are not presented in 
an exclusivist way.19 The state religion of Utopia enforces belief only in 
the doctrines of Providence and the immortality of the soul, the basis of 
all religion according to Ficino, and public worship is so organized as not 
to exclude any particular religion; rites peculiar to particular religions are 
practiced in private. Utopus is said to have been against dogmatism on the 
grounds that God perhaps likes “diverse and manifold forms of worship 
(cultus) and hence inspires diﬀerent people with diﬀerent ones,”20 a view 
that echoes Ficino’s statement in the De christiana religione that variety of 
worship “in accordance with God’s ordination, perhaps engenders a certain 
marvelous glory in the world.”21 Like Cusanus’s vision of religious unity 
in the De pace ﬁdei (una religio in varietate rituum), all Utopian religions 
agree on the central truth of religion, the worship of God: “they are like 
travelers going to a single destination by diﬀerent roads.”22
More’s proto-Enlightenment message of using philosophy to overcome 
religious discords was largely drowned out in the clamor of Reformation 
controversy. But when Ficinian Platonism was revived in the later sixteenth 
century it is clear that one of the attractions of his pia philosophia was 
19  Ibid., pp. 218–223.
20  Ibid., pp. 222–3; see also note 22.
21  Marsilio Ficino, Opera omnia, 2 vols. (Basel, 1576, repr. Turin, 1983), 1: 4.
22  More, Utopia, p. 235: “Quae quoniam non est ibi apud omnes eadem [religio], et uni-
versae tamen eius formae quamquam variae ac multiplices in divinae naturae cultum velut 
in unum ﬁnem diversa via commigrant, idcirco nihil in templis visitur auditurque quod non 
quadrare ad cunctas in commune videatur.”
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the hope it oﬀered of religious concord. The motive is stated explicitly in 
the preface to Francesco Patrizi da Cherso’s Nova de universis philosophia, 
published in 1593 and dedicated to Pope Gregory XIII “and to all Future 
Roman Pontiﬀs.”23 In the preface to this work, Patrizi denounces contempo-
rary philosophy, citing the common saying: “He’s a philosopher, he doesn’t 
believe in God.” “People see that in all the gymnasia of Europe, in all the 
monasteries, only Aristotelian philosophy is taught with great ambition 
and with great rewards.” It was only Platonic philosophy, pious philosophy, 
which could heal the divisions of the Christian commonwealth, supply an 
adequate philosophical support for Christian theology, and provide the 
strongest weapons in the battle against heresy. For Patrizi, as for Cusanus, 
the best remedy for heresy was to absorb and sublimate its partial, merely 
verbal truths into a higher metaphysical truth. By reforming Catholic 
theology along Platonic lines Patrizi hoped to tap into an ancient wisdom 
that would permit a higher theological synthesis—a synthesis that could 
in turn embrace, rather than suppress, theological traditions outside of 
the Roman Church, including Judaism, Islam, paganism, and the religious 
beliefs of pre-Columbian civilizations in the New World. The old marriage 
between Christian theology and Aristotelianism, Patrizi believed, was now 
dysfunctional, and could lead only to the forcing of consciences and the 
use of violence against those outside the Church. Patrizi urges the Pope 
to have his new universal Platonic philosophy be taught everywhere in 
Christendom so that Christian wisdom may be renewed.
In short, the Renaissance Platonists can be seen as pioneers of modern 
interfaith dialogue, the dialogue that is so prominent a feature of organized 
religions today. It is true that none of them could be described as true reli-
gious pluralists, as they did not regard all religions as equally valid pathways 
to spiritual reality.24 That position seems to depend on an assumption of the 
indemonstrability of religious truth, which is in turn dependent on a more 
23  Francesco Patrizi da Cherso, Nova de universis philosophia libris quinquaginta com-
prehensa, in qua Aristotelica methodo non per motum sed per lucem & lumina ad primam 
causam ascenditur, deinde nova quadam ac peculiari methodo tota in contemplationem venit 
divinitas, postremo methodo Platonica rerum universitas à conditore Deo deducitur, auctore 
Francisco Patritio, philosopho eminentissmo et in celeberrimo Romano gymnasio summa cum 
laude eandem Philosophiam publice interpretante (Venice, 1593). See James Hankins, “Plato’s 
Psychogony in the Later Renaissance: Changing Attitudes to the Christianization of Pagan 
Philosophy,” forthcoming in the proceedings of the conference Die Rezeption von Platons 
«Timaios» in Antike, Mittelalte und Renaissance, Villa Vigoni, Lake Como, 21–25 May 2003, 
to be published in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, vol. 32, eds. Thomas Leinkauf and Carlos 
Steel (Leuven, 2005), pp. 393–412.
24  The terms “pluralist” and “inclusivist” (below) are taken from McGrath, Christian 
Theology, pp. 544–51.
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modern epistemology than was available in the Renaissance.25 But there is 
considerable common ground between Renaissance Platonists and mod-
ern inclusivist theologians, found primarily in the Catholic and Anglican 
churches, who emphasize the religious truths found in other traditions. Karl 
Rahner’s argument that Christians should be able to discern valid elements 
in the holy books of other faiths, just as they ﬁnd still valid truths in the 
Old Testament, has a precise parallel in Ficino’s idea of an ancient theol-
ogy whose wisdom is still of high value in the post-Incarnational world. 
Even if Renaissance Platonists might not have gone so far as Rahner in 
aﬃrming the soteriological potential of other faiths—at least in the inter-
est of avoiding unwanted attentions from the Inquisition—they perhaps go 
farther than Rahner in asserting the potential of other faiths to illuminate 
the Christian faith. Had there been fewer constraints on freedom of reli-
gious expression, it is possible, even likely, that the Platonists’ tendency to 
conﬂate salvation and contemplative union with God would have led to a 
more robust aﬃrmation of the possibility of salvation outside the Church. 
Ficino’s famous comparisons of Socrates with Christ and Moses with Plato 
in Book 8 of his Letters suggest as much.26
Ficino is perhaps the Renaissance thinker who meditated most pro-
foundly on the nature of religion, and his writings illustrate a number of 
ways in which the situation of Renaissance Christians anticipates the mod-
ern religious situation—or perhaps one should say the modern religious 
predicament. If we turn to Book 14 of the Platonic Theology, for example, 
we ﬁnd in chapters 9 and 10 a remarkable discussion of religion which is 
here, of course, instrumental to the work’s larger purpose of proving the 
immortality of the soul.27 Ficino begins by asking what constitutes the 
distinct perfection of human nature—what is it that truly separates man-
kind from the animals? It is not the ability to make diﬀerent objects or to 
govern ourselves, since the beasts also do this in a way. It is not speech 
that distinguishes us, as Cicero or Valla might claim, since the animals 
25  See Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, whose pluralism is built on Kant’s distinction 
between the noumenal (the transcendent) and the phenomenal (particular beliefs of world 
religions).
26  Marsilio Ficino, Epistole (Venice, 1495), conveniently available in facsimile with a 
collation of the MSS. in The Letters of Marsilio Ficino, trans. Members of the Language 
Department of the School of Economic Science, London, 7 (London, 2003), pp. 157–86; the 
relevant letters are on pp. 159–62. For a perceptive discussion of natural religion in Ficino, 
see Paul Richard Blum, “La religione naturale di Marsilio Ficino,” in Marsile Ficin ou les 
Mystères Platoniciens, ed. Stéphane Toussaint (Paris, 2002), pp. 313–26. On the possibility 
of the salvation of the pagans, see further below.
27  Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology, eds. and trans. Michael J.B. Allen and James Hankins, 
5 vols. to date (Cambridge, MA, 2001–2005), 4: 290–329.
MAZZOCCO_f9_137-153   147 3/10/06   18:02:34148  james hankins
also communicate for social purposes. It is not even practical or specula-
tive reason, for even these activities “seem to have a shadowy counterpart 
among the beasts.” Here, of course, Ficino is breaking radically with the 
Aristotelian tradition, which regarded reason as the speciﬁc diﬀerence of 
human nature, and his discussion of the rational powers of beasts makes 
him sound almost like Darwin in The Descent of Man (chapters 3–4). What 
Ficino identiﬁes as the special perfection of man is religion, deﬁned as 
contemplation of the divine, or shortly afterwards as “that instinct which is 
common and natural to all peoples and which we everywhere and always 
use to think about Providence and to worship it as the queen of the world.” 
Humanity is led to this universal piety by a “natural sagacity infused in us 
by Providence itself”; by philosophical reasons (especially the argument 
from design); and by prophecy and miracles. As we have already learned 
in Book 13, prophecy and miracles are phenomena by no means conﬁned 
to the Christian world, but are found wherever the divine darts down and 
orders time and nature after its own image.28 And since mankind is naturally 
social, it naturally stands in need of a divine lawgiver, whether his name 
is Moses, Numa Pompilius, or Mohammed.
This is not to say that all revelations are equal, of course, and in the De 
christiana religione we learn that, if Christianity is not the only avenue of 
God’s self-disclosure, it is the highest. “At no time does Divine Providence 
allow any part of the world to be without some kind of religious wisdom”—
Hermetism in Africa, Zoroastrianism in Asia, Orphism and Druidism in 
Europe—but there are higher and lower forms of religious wisdom, and 
there are also moments in history when religious wisdom has lain dormant 
or hidden in obscurity.29 Christianity is the highest and clearest and fullest 
form of religious wisdom, the wisdom that provides keys to unlock the 
mysteries of other religious traditions. Still, the divine is naturally knowable 
by all men, and for Ficino, as for Cusanus and More’s Utopians, the rite 
according to which one worships is ultimately less important than what and 
how one worships. As he writes in the argument to Plato’s Laws, Book 8,
28  Note that, unlike Aquinas, Ficino does not distinguish between Christian miracles done 
in virtute divina and non-Christian miracles; like Avicenna Ficino has a naturalistic account 
of miracles that assimilates them all, pagan and Christian, to the same set of supranormal 
psychic powers. See James Hankins, “Ficino, Avicenna and the Occult Powers of the Soul,” 
forthcoming in the proceedings of the conference La magia nell’Europa moderna. Tra antica 
sapienza e ﬁlosoﬁa naturale: tradizioni e mutamenti (Florence, Istituto Nazionale di Studi 
sul Rinascimento). More’s Utopia also seems to defend the idea of non-Christian miracles 
which the Utopians believe to be “direct and visible manifestations of the divinity.” More, 
Utopia, pp. 226–7.
29  Ficino, Opera omnia, 1: 31–32.
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Plato held one should not pay so much attention to the rite according to 
which one worshipped, as to the reason why one worshipped. For if you did 
this for the sake of the highest king of all [an epithet of God used in ps. Plato, 
Epistulae 2.312e] and out of desire for eternal goods, it is probable that from 
whatever source and in whatever way you begin, you will through worship of 
this kind at some time approach nearer the highest, and either be surrounded 
by his immense light or at least saved by his overﬂowing goodness.30
The last phrase is roughly equivalent to “perfected in intellect or at least in 
will”; the need for both faculties to be perfected is a common Augustinian 
theme in Ficino’s philosophy.
Ficino seems here to be saying through Plato’s mouth that divine illumi-
nation and salvation are available to all men, irrespective of the religious 
rites they follow—even perhaps that the Beatiﬁc Vision and summum 
gaudium are available to non-Christians. As generally in his writings, he 
assimilates the Platonic vision of the Good to the Beatiﬁc Vision.
It should be noted that Ficino’s attitude to other religions in these pas-
sages is not one of mere tolerance. Tolerance implies that one is oneself 
in possession of the truth but for prudential reasons one does not wish 
to force consciences. Nor can we describe Ficino’s attitude as relativistic. 
Ficino is not saying that all religions are equally true, equally valuable 
pathways to the divine; nor, certainly, is he following that other form of 
cultural relativism which says that the multiplicity of religions proves that 
they are all false. Nor again is his attitude ecumenical, in the sense of aim-
ing at a single understanding of Christianity or at a single, uniﬁed world 
religion. His attitude is closer to what Charles Taylor has described as 
neo-Durkheimian, typiﬁed by American denominationalism. One believes 
one’s own religion, one thinks it stands closest to the truth. It is a guide 
and an avenue to authentic religious experiences. But one also respects 
other religious traditions, and even approves of them in a civic context as 
positive inﬂuences on the behavior of one’s fellow-citizens. One assumes 
that other religions enable valuable religious experiences, that they contain 
a form of religious wisdom; one may even come to the point of wanting 
to learn from other religions and to incorporate their insights into one’s 
own. It is an attitude of respect for and openness to other religious tradi-
tions, even if the principle in Ficino’s case (as in Cusanus’) is sometimes 
vitiated by intolerant outbursts against particular aspects of non-Christian 
religions, especially Judaism.31
30  Platonis opera, trans. Marsilio Ficino (Venice, 1491), f. 300ra.
31  Charles Taylor, Varieties of Religion Today (Cambridge, MA, 2003), pp. 93–94.
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Chapter 10 of the Platonic Theology, Book 13, is even more radically 
modern in the view it reveals of the religious condition of mankind. In 
this chapter Ficino is taking on—if I am not mistaken for the ﬁrst time 
in the history of Christian apologetics—the materialistic etiology of reli-
gion found in Lucretius’ De rerum natura. Lucretius, though not denying 
the existence of the gods, understands religious fear of the gods to be an 
irrational emotion having its source in ignorance and the weakness of 
human nature, reinforced by corrupt custom. Organized religions, especially 
those sponsored by the state or invented by primitive lawgivers, exploit 
these fears in order to coerce good behavior from wayward citizens. But 
a just view of nature, man and society such as Epicurus oﬀered allows the 
philosopher to lay aside religious fear, as well as the psychic disturbances 
and other evils it causes, and to achieve tranquility.
Ficino responded to this primitive psychology of religion with a kind 
of psychology of irreligion, or perhaps one should call it a physiology of 
irreligion.32 For Ficino it is axiomatic that religion is natural to mankind, 
and a pious disposition is the natural product of balanced sanguine humors, 
or in other words of health and sanity. One might observe in passing that 
this view is perhaps not as unscientiﬁc as it might sound, and a number 
of evolutionary psychologists and anthropologists regard religious belief as 
a biological universal.33 In any case, for Ficino it is unbelief that requires 
explanation, not belief. Ficino sees the unbelief characteristic of artists and 
intellectuals as the result of an excess of ratiocination, resulting in the pre-
dominance of the melancholic humor—dry, cold and black. “Such a humor,” 
writes Ficino, “being the contrary of life, banishes life’s hope and injects 
doubt, the enemy of life, into the rational soul.” Doubt is literally a disease 
of the soul, and it is this disease of depression or melancholy, sometimes 
exacerbated by astrological conditions, that is responsible for the irreligion 
of intellectuals. “They doubt, not because they excel in intellectual ability 
and doctrine, but because the earthy humor makes them doubtful and 
cowardly.”34 The tendency of the melancholic humor to engender religious 
doubt in intellectuals was one reason, perhaps the chief reason, why Ficino 
32  Compare Augustine, De vera religione 38.69; In Joannis evangelium tractatus 106.4; 
Enarratio in Psalmos 53.2; De trinitate 8.3.4.
33  Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature (New York, 2002), 
appendix, and Pascal Boyer, Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought 
(New York, 2001), especially chapter 1.
34  Ficino, Oper omnia. 
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devoted so large a part of his treatise on magic, the De vita, to combating 
this dangerous disposition to impiety.
In the course of his attack on Lucretius there emerges implicitly from 
Ficino’s pages another figure, a contemporary of his, the Renaissance 
doubter. He is a young man, conﬁdent in his own powers of reasoning, 
disinclined to accept authority, always demanding a reason for everything, 
morally and constitutionally incapable of seeing the hidden metaphysical 
principles upon which religion rests. He is likely to be idle, licentious, 
ﬂippant and a lover of the ridiculous—perhaps a Luigi Pulci or a Piero 
di Cosimo; perhaps even a Lorenzo de’ Medici.35 At a more advanced age 
he will be bitter, without hope, depressed and incurious. It is this sort of 
man that Ficino is urging not to give up on religion. Such a man should 
realize that the wisdom of religion is not going to be apparent to him 
until he has had more experience of life, until the riot of his passions has 
subsided with age, until he has trained himself morally and intellectually 
to receive higher truths that are not available to the lumen siccum of the 
pure rationalist. The contemplative life requires more than cleverness, more 
than the vigorous exercise of the brain; it is a spiritual discipline requiring 
faith, hope and charity. That spiritual discipline gives us a vision of the 
whole, a rich sense of the world’s meaning from which an understanding 
of the divine can ﬂow.
It is in this dialogue between the religious philosopher and the rationalist 
doubter that we can glimpse something of the modern condition in mat-
ters of religion. Mutatis mutandis, we might even see William James in his 
Varieties of Religious Experience (1903), a book now over a hundred years 
old, but still in print, a foundational text in the modern discipline of the 
psychology of religion, and a work described recently by Cliﬀord Geertz 
as “still highly relevant to contemporary conditions.”36 Here and in his es-
says on The Will to Believe (1897) James argued, in a way reminiscent of 
Ficino, against scientiﬁc rationalists (“humanists” as they would later be 
called in America) who regarded religion as simply irrational, sentimental 
balderdash, a thing of the past. James, by contrast, saw scientiﬁc rationalism 
as too thin, somehow, not capturing enough of the mystery of life, not ad-
dressing the deep questions. For those deeper questions, James thinks, we 
need religious answers, even if those answers cannot immediately withstand 
35  James Hankins, “Lorenzo de’ Medici as a Student of Ficino: The De summo bono,” in 
Humanism and Platonism, 2: 317–350.
36  Cliﬀord Geertz, Available Light (Princeton, NJ, 2000), p. 185.
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the rationalist’s cross-examination. But James, like Ficino, feels the need to 
defend this suspense of one’s critical faculties; he needs in other words to 
elaborate an ethics of belief. So James mounts a powerful argument that 
religion is a domain where belief is necessarily antecedent to grasping the 
truths of faith.
There are cases where a fact cannot come at all unless a preliminary faith 
exists in its coming. And where faith in a fact can help create the fact, that 
would be an insane logic which should say that faith running ahead of scien-
tiﬁc evidence is the “lowest kind of immorality” into which a thinking being 
can fall. Yet such is the logic by which our scientiﬁc absolutists pretend to 
regulate our lives!37
As interpreted by Charles Taylor, James is “building on the Augustinian 
insight that in certain domains love and self-opening enable us to under-
stand what we would never grasp otherwise.”38 Taylor quotes Augustine’s 
dictum in the Contra faustum (32.18), (Non intratur in veritatem nisi per 
charitatem), assimilating it to James’ justiﬁcation of his ethics of belief: 
“Better risk chance of error than loss of truth.” Taylor’s Augustinian parallel 
might tempt us to dismiss Ficino’s engagement with religious skepticism 
as an eternal problem, not a distinctively modern one. Every age has its 
believers and its skeptics, one might claim; Augustine, Ficino and James 
were all engaged in a common, transhistorical dialogue between those who 
demand reasons before believing and those who think one must believe 
in order to understand.
Charles Taylor is an authoritative historian of philosophy as well as an 
eminent philosopher, and one hesitates to disagree with him. Yet it seems 
to me a mistake, an anachronism, to neglect the key diﬀerences between 
the Augustinian and the Jamesian projects. As an attentive reading of the 
Confessions I think shows, Augustine’s belief that love or charity is the portal 
of truth is not tantamount to a belief in the necessity of a leap of faith. To 
be sure, grace and love guide the intellect to truth and allow the intellect 
to abide in truth. Certainly love gives stability to the truths of reason. But 
grace and love have no direct cognitive or pre-cognitive function. In his 
own path to Christianity Augustine already knew the truth intellectually 
before he committed his will to God; charity impelled his will to embrace 
a truth already known. Above all, Augustine’s account of conversion has no 
concern speciﬁcally with the ethics of belief. He does not think of Christian 
37  William James, Pragmatism and Other Writings, ed. Giles Gunn (London, 2000),   
p. 214, emphasis in the original.
38  Taylor, Varieties of Religion Today, p. 47.
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faith as potentially compromising rationality; Christian teaching for him 
is a conclusion of reason.
In this respect, despite the innumerable other differences between 
Ficino and James, the Florentine philosopher is in James’ world and not in 
Augustine’s. It must of course be granted that what motivates Ficino’s plea 
to suspend antecedent demands for proof in undertaking religious com-
mitment is motivated by considerations quite diﬀerent from the pragmatist 
motives invoked by James. Nevertheless, Ficino lives in the same atmosphere 
of religious doubt as James does. Ficino lived in a world of university 
intellectuals where the great majority of trained philosophers regarded 
Christian belief, for example the belief in the immortality of the soul, as 
incompatible with the most prestigious natural philosophy of the day, that of 
Aristotle as interpreted by Averroes and Alexander of Aphrodisias.39 What 
gives Ficino’s dialogue with the Lucretiani, Epicurei and other skeptics its 
distinctively modern cast is precisely its focus on the psychology and eth-
ics of belief—what causes someone to believe or disbelieve, and why one 
might ethically have an obligation to believe or not to believe. These were 
not themes that greatly exercised ancient or medieval thinkers, but they 
have become central problems for religious thinkers in a world where the 
scientiﬁc world-view and scientiﬁc method, on the one hand, and religious 
belief and religious modes of believing, on the other hand, appear to have 
parted ways. It is, I believe, a strong argument for the modernity of the 
Renaissance that such issues begin to be explored with ever greater intensity 
and sophistication by humanistic thinkers like Marsilio Ficino.
39  See the famous passage in the preface to his Plotinus translation (Opera omnia, 2: 537) 
where Ficino states, with some exaggeration, that totus ferme terrarum orbis has been taken 
over by two sects of Aristotelians, the Averroists and the Alexandrians. On Ficino’s quarrel 
with secularizing university intellectuals see my “Marsilio Ficino as a Critic of Scholasticism,” 
in Humanism and Platonism, 2: 459–70.
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